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Plaintiffs Christopher Calise and Anastasia Groschen (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their undersigned counsel, bring this class 
action complaint seeking monetary and injunctive relief against Defendant Facebook, Inc. 
(“Facebook” or the “Company”).1  Plaintiffs allege the following upon information and belief 
based on the investigation of counsel, except as to those allegations that specifically pertain to 
Plaintiffs, which are alleged upon personal knowledge.2  
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. This case seeks to put an end to Facebook’s policy of actively soliciting, 
encouraging, and assisting scammers it knows, or should know, are using its platform to defraud 
Facebook users with deceptive ads, and compel Facebook to either compensate Facebook users 
for their losses or disgorge the billions of dollars in profits it has unjustly earned from such 
misconduct. 
2. Facebook collects vast amounts of data from each Facebook user. While Facebook 
does not pay users for it, this data has enormous financial value since it enables Facebook to sell 
precisely targeted ads to millions of advertisers. Scammers discovered they could exploit these 
targeting capabilities to get deceptive, false and/or misleading ads viewed by the Facebook users 
most likely to click those ads and be lured into bait-and-switch and other fraudulent schemes (the 
“Deceptive Facebook Ads”).  As various scammers told Bloomberg News in 2017, Facebook has 
“revolutionized scamming.”3 
3. Given the foreseeability of material harm to Facebook users from scammers, 
Facebook should have promptly shut down these scammers as soon as they started surfacing on its 
platform.  Facebook had and continues to have a duty to do so given, among other factors, (i) 
promises in its Terms of Service to remove false and misleading ads, (ii) advertising policies 
 
1 Plaintiff Calise sought to address and resolve the allegations and relief sought in this complaint 
through a pre-suit demand, dated June 1, 2021, and subsequent discussions by and between counsel 
for Plaintiffs and Facebook.   
2 All emphasis herein is added, unless otherwise noted. 
3 Zeke Faux, How Facebook Helps Shady Advertisers Pollute the Internet, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (March 27, 2018) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-27/ad-
scammers-need-suckers-and-facebook-helps-find-them (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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strictly prohibiting such ads, and (iii) the vast investigative, technical, and financial capabilities 
and resources at Facebook’s disposal to combat fraud. But Facebook refuses to drive scammers 
off its platform because it generates billions of dollars per year in revenue from Deceptive 
Facebook Ads. 
4. Facebook has done much more than passively create and maintain a platform on
which scammers can brazenly target users with scams.  According to internal Facebook 
documents, and current and former Facebook employees and contractors recently interviewed by 
various investigative journalists at prominent publications,4 Facebook actively solicits, 
encourages, and assists scammers in numerous ways. On the revenue side, according to these 
investigations, Facebook’s sales teams have presented at conferences heavily attended by known 
scammers, socialized with known scammers for business development purposes, and met revenue 
quotas by encouraging known scammers to continue buying Facebook ads. Facebook’s sales teams 
have also been aggressively soliciting ad sales in China and providing extensive training services 
and materials to China-based advertisers, despite an internal study showing that nearly thirty 
percent (30%) of the ads placed by China-based advertisers — estimated to account for $2.6 billion 
in 2020 ad sales alone — violated at least one of Facebook’s own ad policies.  
5. On the enforcement side, according to these investigations, Facebook has
affirmatively directed employees and contractors tasked with monitoring Facebook’s platform for 
deceptive ads to (i) ignore ads placed by hacked Facebook accounts and pages, as long as Facebook 
gets paid for these ads, and (ii) ignore violations of Facebook’s Ad Policies, especially by China-
based advertisers (since Facebook “want[s] China revenue”).  
6. In October 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) reported that about 94%
of the complaints it collected concerning online shopping fraud on social media identified 
Facebook (or its Instagram site) as the source.5  
4 See footnotes 21-34 and 40 infra. 
5 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Data Shows Big Jump in Consumer Reports 
about Scams Originating on Social Media (Oct. 21, 2020),https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2020/10/ftc-data-shows-big-jump-consumer-reports-about-scams-
originating, (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
Case 3:21-cv-06186-KAW   Document 1   Filed 08/11/21   Page 3 of 48
  
 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 































7. Cracking down on scammers would jeopardize the billions of dollars per year in ad 
revenue that Facebook collects from scammers. Therefore, even as Facebook’s public relations 
team touts the closing of certain accounts and lawsuits targeting a few scammers, Facebook 
remains economically motivated to continue soliciting, encouraging, and assisting scammers at the 
expense of its users. As Tim Hwang, the author of a book on ad fraud, told Buzzfeed, “I think the 
profit motive definitely makes it harder for Facebook to take real steps here.”6 Therefore, 
declaratory and injunctive relief is necessary to prevent future harm to Facebook users. 
8. The injunctive relief (“Proposed Injunctive Relief”) that Plaintiffs seek includes, 
but is not limited to, directing Facebook to implement and monitor changes to Facebook’s 
processes, practices, and policies to substantially reduce the display of Deceptive Facebook Ads 
on Facebook’s website and protect Facebook users from being victimized by scam ads, including 
without limitation, implementing and monitoring changes to processes, practices, and policies with 
respect to: 
(a) vetting new advertisers before permitting them to display ads – particularly 
prospective advertisers based in China and other countries where a material 
percentage of ads violate Facebook's ad policies;  
(b) preventing repeat offenders from circumventing enforcement mechanisms 
to continue displaying scam ads (e.g., through hacking and/or set-up of new 
Facebook accounts);  
(c) promptly processing and responding to reports of scam ads submitted by 
Facebook users;  
(d) identifying and promptly removing ads that violate Facebook’s ad policies; 
(e) educating users about the location and use of tools available to protect 
themselves against scam ads, and how to report scam ads to Facebook; 
 
6 Craig Silverman and Ryan Mac, Facebook Gets Rich Off Of Ads That Rip Off Its Users 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-ad-scams-revenue-china-tiktok-
vietnam (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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(f) compensating Facebook employees and contractors tasked with monitoring
Facebook’s websites for scam ads to ensure, among other things, that such
employees and contractors are incentivized to prioritize protection of
Facebook users from Deceptive Facebook Ads without having to consider
the ramifications of their actions on Facebook’s revenue;
(g) compensating Facebook’s sales, marketing, and business development
teams to ensure, among other things, that such teams are not financially
incentivized to solicit scammers or encourage scammers to continue
purchasing Facebook ads (including but not limited a review of ad sales
practices with respect to China and other countries where a material
percentage of ads violate Facebook’s ad policies); and
(h) expanding Facebook’s existing Purchase Protection program for purchases
made on the Facebook website to victims who are tricked by scammers into
fraudulent transactions occurring off the Facebook website.
9. Plaintiffs also seek monetary relief in the form of damages and/or disgorgement of
profits unjustly earned by Facebook. By collecting troves of data from Facebook users without 
compensating them, and then earning vast sums from scammers who leverage that data to target 
Deceptive Facebook Ads at vulnerable Facebook users, Facebook has breached legal and 
contractual duties owed to its users, and unjustly enriched itself at their expense.   
10. Plaintiffs seek monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief against Facebook on behalf
of themselves and other similarly-situated Facebook users by asserting claims for negligence; 
breach of contract; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violations of California’s 
Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.) (“UCL”); and unjust 
enrichment. 
PARTIES 
11. Plaintiff Christopher Calise is citizen and resident of the State of Oregon, and over
the age of eighteen years. Mr. Calise has had a Facebook account since 2009. 
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12. Plaintiff Anastasia Groschen is a citizen and resident of the State of Nebraska, and 
over the age of eighteen years. Ms. Groschen has had a Facebook account since 2007. 
13. Facebook is a publicly-traded Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business located within this District at 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, California 94025. 
14. Facebook conceived, reviewed, approved, directed, and controlled the misconduct 
alleged herein in California; and collected the revenue wrongfully earned from such misconduct 
in California. 
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CHOICE OF LAW 
15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because at least one member of the Class, 
which exceeds 100 members in the aggregate, is a citizen of a different state than Facebook and 
the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 
16. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Facebook because it transacts business in 
this State, and because the tortious conduct alleged in this Complaint occurred in, was directed to, 
and/or emanated from California. 
17. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391 because Facebook is 
headquartered in this District, and conducts business transactions in this District, and because the 
wrongful conduct giving rise to this case occurred in, was directed from, and/or emanated from 
this District. 
18. Facebook’s Terms of Service contains a choice of law and venue provision 
providing as follows: 
For any claim, cause of action, or dispute you have against us that arises out of or 
relates to these Terms or the Facebook Products (“claim”), you agree that it will be 
resolved exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California or a state court located in San Mateo County. You also agree to submit 
to the personal jurisdiction of either of these courts for the purpose of litigating any 
such claim, and that the laws of the State of California will govern these Terms 
and any claim, without regard to conflict of law provisions.7 
  
 
7 Facebook Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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A.  The User Data Fueling Facebook’s Advertising Revenue 
19. Facebook is the world’s largest social media company, providing its users with 
social networking services that enable them to connect and communicate with family, friends and 
colleagues concerning subjects of common interest. 
20. As of March 31, 2021, Facebook reported 2.85 billion monthly active users, and 
1.88 billion daily active users. Facebook has become such a staple of 21st-century life — with 
huge numbers of people relying on it daily for news, product recommendations and social 
interaction — that many politicians and academics have characterized it as a public utility.8 Indeed, 
in a 2007 interview with Time, Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, himself characterized 
Facebook as a “social utility.”9  
21. Facebook does not charge Facebook users for its services. Instead, it generates 
virtually all of its revenue from selling advertising to businesses seeking to market their products 
and services to Facebook users. During 2020, Facebook generated revenue of $85.97 billion, of 
which 98%, or $84.17 billion, was from advertising.  
22. Facebook has over 7 million active monthly advertisers.10 
 
8 See also Dipayan Ghosh, Don’t Break Up Facebook—Treat It Like a Utility, HARVARD 
BUSINESS REVIEW (May 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/dont-break-up-facebook-treat-it-like-
a-utility (last visited on July 2, 2021); Anjana Susarla, Facebook shifting from open platform to 
public utility, UPI (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2018/08/17/Facebook-shifting-from-open-platform-to-
public-utility/1721534507642/ (last visited on June 23, 2021); Ryan Grim, Steven Bannon Wants 
Facebook and Google Regulated Like Utilities, THE INTERCEPT (July 27, 2017), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/07/27/steve-bannon-wants-facebook-and-google-regulated-like-
utilities/ (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
9 Lauren Locke, The Future of Facebook, TIME (July 17, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1644040,00.html (last visited on July 2, 
2021). 
10 Facebook for Business, Insights to Go, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/iq/insights-to-
go/6m-there-are-more-than-6-million-active-advertisers-on-facebook (last accessed July 2, 
2021). 
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23. Facebook’s pitch to advertisers is simple: we leverage user data to show the right 
ads to the right people. As Zuckerberg testified before the Senate’s Commerce and Judiciary 
Committees on April 10, 2018: 
What we allow is for advertisers to tell us who they want to reach, and then we do 
the placement.  So, if an advertiser comes to us and says, ‘All right, I am a ski shop 
and I want to sell skis to women,’ then we might have some sense, because people 
shared skiing-related content, or said they were interested in that, they shared 
whether they’re a woman, and then we can show the ads to the right people. . .”11 
24. To fulfill its promise to advertisers to target the right ads at the right people, 
Facebook collects massive amounts of data concerning its users. For example, on December 27, 
2016, the investigative nonprofit, ProPublica, reported that it had identified more than 52,000 
unique interest categories used by Facebook to classify its users (such as interests in different types 
of food, stores, clothing, movies, etc.).12 These interests are inferred by Facebook in part based on 
the actions that users take while they are logged in to Facebook, such the pages they have liked or 
ads they have clicked. As ProPublica explained: “Every time a Facebook member likes a post, tags 
a photo, updates their favorite movies in their profile, posts a comment about a politician, or 
changes their relationship status, Facebook logs it.”13 
25. Facebook also collects information about pages that users visit outside of the 
Facebook platform. For example, the Facebook pixel is a small piece of code that businesses can 
 
11 See Joint Full Committee Hearing, Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse 
of Data, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/facebook-social-media-privacy-and-the-use-and-
abuse-of-data (last visited on July 2, 2021); Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-
hearing/?utm_term=.08d8f25b84bf (last accessed July 2, 2021). 
12 Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu and Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users Everything It 
Really Knows About Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-
them (last visited on July 2, 2021). See also Facebook Ad Categories, PROPUBLICA DATA 
STORE (Dec. 2016), https://www.propublica.org/datastore/dataset/facebook-ad-categories (last 
visited on June 23, 2021). 
13 Julia Angwin, Terry Parris Jr. and Surya Mattu, What Facebook Knows About You, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/breaking-the-black-box-what-
facebook-knows-about-you (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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put on their website to track what pages users visited, and what purchases they made, and match 
this data back to Facebook user profiles for the purpose of displaying ads.14 
26. Whenever a new user logs in to Facebook’s platform, Facebook’s software accesses
the data it has collected on that user to determine what ads to display. The selection process takes 
the form of an online auction in which advertisers compete to show their ads to a particular 
Facebook user whom Facebook predicts (based on user data) will be interested in those ads. Since 
there are nearly two billion daily active Facebook users, billions of these auctions occur every day 
(each taking milliseconds).15 
27. The set of instructions that Facebook’s software follows to determine which ads to
display to a particular user is known as an algorithm. Facebook’s ad algorithm weighs three factors: 
(i) an advertiser’s bid, (ii) estimated action rate, and (iii) ad quality. The “estimated action rate” is
the algorithm’s estimate of how likely a particular user is to click, view or otherwise engage with 
a particular ad based on that user’s data points, while “ad quality” is a variable based on feedback 
from various sources concerning the text and images in an ad.16 
B. Facebook’s Terms of Service
28. Section 1 of Facebook’s Terms of Service (see supra note 7) (“TOS”) — titled “The
services we provide” — provides in relevant part: 
Our mission is to give people the power to build community and bring the world 
closer together. To help advance this mission, we provide the Products and services 
described below to you…. 
Combat harmful conduct and protect and support our community: 
People will only build community on Facebook if they feel safe. We employ 
dedicated teams around the world and develop advanced technical systems to 
detect misuse of our Products, harmful conduct towards others, and situations 
where we may be able to help support or protect our community. If we learn of 
content or conduct like this, we will take appropriate action - for example, offering 
help, removing content, removing, or restricting access to certain features, disabling 
an account, or contacting law enforcement. We share data with other Facebook 
14 Show your ads to the right people with the Facebook pixel, FACEBOOK FOR BUSINESS, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/m/pixel-manual-install (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
15 Business Help Center, About Ad Auctions, FACEBOOK FOR BUSINESS, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/430291176997542 (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
16 Id. 
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Companies when we detect misuse or harmful conduct by someone using one of 
our Products. 
Use and develop advanced technologies to provide safe and functional services for 
everyone: 
We use and develop advanced technologies - such as artificial intelligence, machine 
learning systems, and augmented reality - so that people can use our Products safely 
regardless of physical ability or geographic location . . . And we develop automated 
systems to improve our ability to detect and remove abusive and dangerous 
activity that may harm our community and the integrity of our Products. 
29. Section 3 of the TOS — titled “Your commitments to Facebook and our
community” — provides in relevant part: 
We provide these services to you and others to help advance our mission. In 
exchange, we need you to make the following commitments…. 
2. What you can share and do on Facebook:
We want people to use Facebook to express themselves and to share content that is 
important to them, but not at the expense of the safety and well-being of others or 
the integrity of our community. You therefore agree not to engage in the conduct 
described below (or to facilitate or support others in doing so): 
1. You may not use our Products to do or share anything:
 That violates these Terms, our Community Standards, and other terms and
policies that apply to your use of Facebook.
 That is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory, or fraudulent.
30. The Community Standards referenced in Section 3 of the TOS are hyperlinked to a
page that provides in relevant part: “Safety: We are committed to making Facebook a safe place.”17 
Under “Safety,” there is section specifying conduct that is prohibited because it is violent or 
criminal, including “5. Fraud and Deception: “In an effort to prevent fraudulent activity that can 
harm people or businesses, we remove content that purposefully deceives, willfully 
misrepresents or otherwise defrauds or exploits others for money or property. This includes 
content that seeks to coordinate or promote these activities using our services. We allow people to 
17 See Community Standards, Introduction, 
FACEBOOK,https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction (last visited on July 2, 
2021). 
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raise awareness and educate others as well as condemn these activities.”18 The next paragraph in 
the “Fraud and Deception” section warns users against posting content “Deceiving others to 
generate a financial or personal benefit to the detriment of a third party or entity through [various 
scams].” 
31. Section 5 of the TOS — titled “Other terms and policies that may apply to you” — 
links in the third bullet to Facebook’s Advertising Policies, which is described as specifying “the 
types of content that may appear in Facebook ads.” Facebook’s Advertising Policies prohibit ads 
that, inter alia: (i) contain deceptive, false, or misleading claims like those relating to the 
effectiveness or characteristics of a product or service (e.g., false or misleading claims about 
product attributes, quality, or functionality), and (ii) promote products, services, schemes or offers 
using deceptive or misleading practices, including those meant to scam people out of money or 
personal information (e.g., use of a picture of a public figure to mislead users into buying a scam 
product).19 Additionally, Facebook’s Advertising Policies prohibit advertisers from using “tactics 
intended to circumvent our ad review process or other enforcement systems.”20 
C.  How Facebook Actively Solicits, Encourages and Assists Scammers 
32. In March 2018, Bloomberg News reporter Zeke Faux published an article 
describing his experiences at an Internet marketing conference in Berlin sponsored by an online 
forum called Stack That Money (STM).21 Faux reported that a significant number of the attendees 
 
18 See Community Standards, 5. Fraud and Deception, 
FACEBOOK,https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/fraud_deception/  (last visited on 
July 2, 2021). 
19 See Advertising Policies, FACEBOOK, (https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/); Advertising 
Policies, 23. Misleading Claims, 
FACEBOOK,https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/misleading_claims; 
Advertising Policies, 27. Unacceptable Business Practices, 
FACEBOOK,https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/unacceptable_business_p
ractices(last visited on July 2, 2021). 
20 See Advertising Policies, 28. Circumventing Systems, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/circumventing_systems (last visited 
on July 2, 2021).    
21 “How Facebook Helps Shady Advertisers Pollute the Internet” March 27, 2018 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-27/ad-scammers-need-suckers-and-
facebook-helps-find-them (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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at the conference were affiliate marketers who earned commissions selling shady products such as 
diet pills by running Facebook ads featuring deceptive pitches like fake celebrity endorsements. 
Exhibitors at the conference pitched these marketers on campaign ideas such as “You Won an 
iPhone” and “Your Computer May be Infected,” and services such as fake Facebook ad accounts. 
33. While the conference was officially sponsored by STM, Faux wrote that “a 
newcomer could be forgiven for wondering if it was somehow sponsored by Facebook Inc.” As 
Faux observed, saleswomen from Facebook “held court onstage, introducing speakers and 
moderating panel discussions,” and “[a]fter the show, Facebook representatives flew to [the 
Spanish isle of] Ibiza on a plane rented by Stack That Money to party with some of the top 
affiliates.”  
34. Facebook’s strong presence at the Berlin conference was no coincidence, as 
attendees were some of Facebook’s best customers who spent millions of dollars a year displaying 
Deceptive Facebook Ads. As marketers explained to Faux, Facebook’s trove of user data had 
“revolutionized scamming” by automatically identifying the “suckers” most likely to click 
Deceptive Facebook Ads for their shady products and services: 
Affiliates once had to guess what kind of person might fall for their unsophisticated 
cons, targeting ads by age, geography, or interests. Now Facebook does that work 
for them. The social network tracks who clicks on the ad and who buys the pills, 
then starts targeting others whom its algorithm thinks are likely to buy. Affiliates 
describe watching their ad campaigns lose money for a few days as Facebook 
gathers data through trial and error, then seeing the sales take off exponentially.22  
 
35. As one affiliate selling deceptively priced skin-care creams with fake endorsements 
from Chelsea Clinton succinctly put it, Facebook goes out and “find[s] the morons for me.”23 
36. When asked by Faux which tools they were using to manage their deceptive 
advertising campaigns, many marketers identified Voluum, an application developed by a former 
STM member named Robert Gryn (see https://voluum.com/). Gryn’s Voluum software was 
popular with marketers because, among other features, it made it easy for marketers to evade the 
 
22 Zeke Faux, How Facebook Helps Shady Advertisers Pollute the Internet, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (March 27, 2018) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-27/ad-
scammers-need-suckers-and-facebook-helps-find-them (last visited on July 2, 2021).  
23 Id. 
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token digital defenses erected by Facebook to detect scam ads. For example, Voluum enables 
affiliates to tailor the ads they display by IP address, which identifies the location of the device 
being used by an individual to access the Internet. This feature allows marketers to “identify the 
addresses of Facebook’s ad reviewers and program campaigns to show them, and only them, 
harmless content.”24 
37. Yet, according to Faux — despite the extensive use of Voluum by scammers — 
Facebook’s most senior executive tasked with enforcing its Ad Policies and fighting deceptive ads, 
Rob Leathern, invited Gryn to visit Facebook’s London office. This was also no coincidence, 
because (according to reports that Gryn showed Faux) affiliates using Voluum alone placed $400 
million worth of ads a year on Facebook. Notably, while Google banned Voluum, Facebook did 
not.25 
38. While Facebook’s salespeople were courting scammers, the Facebook teams 
charged with combatting Deceptive Facebook Ads were woefully understaffed. According to one 
Facebook engineer, the company was more “focused on checking whether ads followed policies 
about things such as the percentage of text and images,” than on “catching people with bad 
intentions.”26 Indeed, marketers told Faux that getting caught and banned by Facebook for 
deceptive ads was no big deal — “they just opened a new Facebook account under different names 
. . . [bought] clean profiles . . . rent[ed] accounts from strangers or cut deals with underhanded 
advertising agencies to find other solutions.”27  
39. Moreover, even as Facebook banned certain accounts, its salespeople encouraged 
the affiliates that opened them to “come to their meetups and parties and . . . buy more ads.”28 As 
two former Facebook employees who worked in the Toronto sales office told Faux, “it was 
common knowledge there that some of their best clients were affiliates who used deception.”29 
 
24 Id. 
25 See id. (“Google banned Voluum over cloaking concerns, but that didn’t derail the company—




29 Id.  
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These salespeople were instructed to push deceptive marketers “to spend more,” with “the rep who 
handled the dirtiest accounts [having] a quota of tens of millions of dollars per quarter.”30 
D.  How Facebook Actively Solicits, Encourages and Assists Scammers Based in China 
40. Leathern (Facebook’s ad policy enforcement chief) promised Faux that “the party’s 
not going to last,” but it has only gotten worse, in particular with respect to advertisers based in 
China. As detailed below, Facebook’s sales teams actively solicit, encourage, and assist advertisers 
in China — despite knowing that a material percentage of China-based advertisers are running 
Deceptive Facebook Ads that exploit Facebook users and violate Facebook’s ad policies. At the 
same time, Facebook employees and contractors tasked with monitoring Facebook’s platform for 
ad fraud, have been affirmatively directed to “look the other way” and ignore Deceptive Facebook 
Ads run by China-based businesses that violate Facebook’s Ad Policies (because Facebook 
“wants” China revenue). 
41. Since 2009, China has used a firewall to bar access to Facebook’s platform in 
China, and according to Facebook’s latest Form 10-K, Facebook is not generally available in 
China. But Facebook has still managed to generate billions of dollars a year in ad revenue from 
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E. The February 2019 New York Times Investigative Report
42. In February 2019, New York Times reporters Paul Mozur and Lin Qiqing explained
how a local Chinese partner called Meet Social was operating a 5,000 square foot showroom 
designed with Facebook’s guidance in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen.31 The showroom — 
dubbed a Facebook “experience center” and opened in the spring of 2018 — is stocked with sales 
material provided by Facebook and hosts prospective clients who wish to advertise on Facebook. 
Facebook employees often visit the experience center to train local businesses on subjects such as 
how to create Facebook ads. Videos about Facebook’s ad offerings are displayed on screens, and 
framed examples of Facebook ads by Chinese brands adorn the walls: 
43. The head of Meet Social, Charles Shen, told the Times that his company anticipated
doing $1 billion to $2 billion in ad sales on Facebook and Instagram in 2019, and that each day his 
company places about 20,000 Chinese ads on Facebook. According to the Times investigative 
report, in addition to Meet Social, there are six other official Facebook advertising resellers in 
31 Paul Mozur and Lin Qiqing, How Facebook’s Tiny China Sales Floor Helps Generate Big Ad 
Money, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology/facebook-china-internet.html (last visited on 
July 2, 2021). 
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China offering similar services to businesses seeking to advertise on Facebook. Without the help 
of advertising resellers recruited by Facebook, Chinese advertisers would be unable to place ads 
on Facebook because of China’s firewall. 
F.  The January 2020 Reuters Investigative Report 
44. In January 2020, Reuters reported that Facebook was setting up a new engineering 
team in Singapore “to focus on its lucrative China advertising business” by developing localized 
ad tools.32 Beyond the engineers, the new office also includes sales staff tasked with growing ad 
sales from Chinese companies. In November 2019, Facebook wrote in Chinese on the popular 
local social network WeChat (with over a billion active monthly users) that “Facebook is 
committed to becoming the best marketing platform for Chinese companies going abroad.”  
45. According to Pivotal Research Group, Facebook’s marketing efforts in China have 
borne fruit, with revenue from Chinese-based advertisers reaching an estimated $5 billion in 2018, 
or about 10 percent of Facebook’s total ad sales that year.33 Assuming the same percentage held 
in 2020, Facebook would have generated $8.5 billion in ad sales from China in 2020. 
46. An internal Facebook ad measurement study, however, found that nearly thirty 
percent (30%) of ads placed by Chinese advertising clients violated at least one Facebook ad 
policy, including promoting financial scams, and pitching products that were never delivered.34 
This means that Facebook generated nearly $2.6 billion in revenue from Chinese ads that violated 
its ad policies in 2020 alone. 
  
 
32 Paresh Dave and Katie Paul, RPT-FOCUS-Facebook defies China headwinds with new ad 
sales push, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/facebook-china-
idUSL1N29C0CD (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
33 Paul Mozur and Lin Qiqing, How Facebook’s Tiny China Sales Floor Helps Generate Big Ad 
Money, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology/facebook-china-internet.html (last visited on 
July 2, 2021) 
34 Craig Silverman and Ryan Mac, Facebook Gets Rich Off Of Ads That Rip Off Its Users, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-ad-scams-revenue-china-tiktok-
vietnam (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
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G. The December 2020 Reuters Investigative Report
47. Based on a review of internal Facebook documents and messages, and interviews
with eight current and former Facebook employees and contractors, a December 10, 2020 
Buzzfeed article by Craig Silverman painted a particularly damning portrait of the “financial 
symbiosis” between Facebook and scammers from China who defraud Facebook users with 
Deceptive Facebook Ads.35 While Facebook feigns protection of its users, Facebook employees 
told Silverman that, in fact, the Company prioritizes revenue over enforcement of its ad policies. 
As one individual with direct knowledge of Facebook ads enforcement explained, Facebook “is 
primarily focused on revenue growth, and user safety comes second.” Another remarked, 
“[Facebook] will take any cent that they can get on anything . . . They do not care whatsoever as 
long as they’re making a dime out of it.” 
48. Like the Deceptive Facebook Ads described in the March 2018 Bloomberg article,
Chinese scam ads use fake celebrity endorsements, as well as pilfered images and videos, to trick 
Facebook users into putting recurring subscription charges on their credit cards that are difficult 
to cancel, overpaying for products that never arrive, or falling victim to bait-and-switch schemes 
in which the product that arrives is not what was advertised and ordered. 
49. For example, in one recent scam impersonating Stihl, a 94-year-old manufacturer
of outdoor tools, Facebook users who clicked a slick video ad to buy one of the company’s 
chainsaws or pruners instead received a single metal chain, an unrelated product, or nothing at all: 
35 Id. 
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50. BuzzFeed’s review of roughly a dozen Facebook ads impersonating Stihl products 
indicated that “half of them, including an ad that attracted close to half a million views, were linked 
to a Chinese company, Ouyi Electronic Commerce Co., Ltd. of Shenzhen” (where, as noted above, 
Facebook’s “experience center” is located). Other fake ads for Stihl products have been linked to 
a UK shell company called Wofun Ltd., which runs scams on behalf of Hong Kong-based 
syndicate called Red Haute Trading, Ltd. 
51. Sources inside Facebook who spoke with investigative reporter Silverman, and 
internal Facebook documents reviewed by his team at Buzzfeed, indicate that enforcement of the 
ad policies purportedly intended to prevent scam ads is extraordinarily lax in part because 
Facebook has outsourced critical ad integrity work to inadequately staffed teams of third-party 
contractors getting paid low hourly wages and receiving no benefits. Worse, these same sources 
and documents show that Facebook prioritizes its own financial interests over those of its users as 
a matter of policy with contractors tasked with monitoring ads often being affirmatively instructed 
to ignore signs of ad fraud unless an issue may cause Facebook to lose money (such as a credit 
card chargeback): 
Internal messages seen by BuzzFeed News show an Accenture manager who led a 
team of 45 ads analysts instructing contract workers to ignore hacked accounts 
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and other violations as long as “Facebook gets paid” for ads through a valid 
payment method. Even if a hacker has taken over a person’s account, contractors 
were told to allow the hacker to place ads, as long the payment method for ads was 
valid.  
“If they are spending their own money and not adding any foreign cards that don’t 
belong to them, then Facebook doesn’t experience any leakage,” the manager wrote 
in July of last year. Leakage refers to credit card chargebacks or other scenarios 
that result in Facebook having to refund the money. 
The Accenture manager justified his guidance to ignore potentially hacked accounts 
and pages by diminishing the risk involved. He said hackers compromise accounts 
that control large pages because they’re “interested in the broad reach these larger 
pages have and simply want to reach larger audiences with legitimate ads.” 
He framed it as a win-win scenario for Facebook and people exploiting its 
advertising system because Facebook earns revenue and the hacker can reach 
more people with their ad. “Facebook gets paid, the bad actors get to run their ads 
to a larger market,” the manager wrote. He joined Facebook as a full-time risk 
investigations analyst in April of this year, according to his Facebook profile.36 
52. After learning of the directives described above, Laura Edelson, a researcher with
NYU’s Online Political Ads Transparency Project, concluded that the job of these Facebook 
contractors is plainly to protect Facebook — and not its users — from fraud. Tim Hwang, author 
of the book on ad fraud, further observed that, based on the sources above, Facebook has subjected 
these contractors to untenable conflicts of interest where they have to think about the impact of 
their enforcement actions on revenue, instead of focusing solely on risk. As for the question of 
revenue versus risk, Hwang noted, “[i]t’s clear through their policy which one Facebook is 
prioritizing.”37 
53. Lax enforcement is particularly acute as applied to China-based advertisers because
of the vast amount of revenue generated by China-based ads. As one source with knowledge of 
Facebook’s ad enforcement advised Silverman, deception by China-based advertisers is well 
known among Facebook’s employees and contractors. The source indicated that “[w]e’re not told 
in the exact words, but [the idea is to] look the other way. It’s ‘Oh, that’s just China being China.’ 
36 Craig Silverman and Ryan Mac, Facebook Gets Rich Off Of Ads That Rip Off Its Users. 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-ad-scams-revenue-china-tiktok-
vietnam (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
37 Id. 
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It is what it is. We want China revenue.” For this reason, the source added, “I would never buy 
anything on Facebook.”38 Further internal Facebook documents reviewed by Buzzfeed revealed 
that “Facebook has been aware of an epidemic of violative ads and scammers operating out of 
China for years.”  
54. According to a former Facebook employee, even when Facebook bans Chinese 
advertisers for violating policies, they simply “return to the platform by setting up new companies 
and creating new Facebook ads accounts.”39 That tactic was used by a Hong Kong-registered 
advertiser, ZestAds, that was purportedly banned by Facebook, yet still purchased and placed 
misleading ads selling face masks after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
H.  The December 2020 Time Investigative Report 
55. The findings above in the December 2020 BuzzFeed article were corroborated a 
week later in a December 18, 2020 Time expose, which featured a recent scam in which ads 
originating from China and Hong Kong-based companies infringed copyrighted sea glass 
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the sculptor — to trick Facebook users into making purchases. But instead of receiving the 
sculptures, buyers received plastic cones or tiny wooden gnomes:40 
56. The Time article traced other Facebook ad scams to China-based advertisers. For 
instance, one Facebook scam ad led to a website called Apriloina.com, which was registered by a 
China-based company. That site shared the same IP addresses, customer support emails, phone 
numbers, and warehouse shipping addresses in Mainland China as thousands of other e-commerce 
websites.  
57. As another example, Time uncovered public links between one Facebook ad scam 
network and two large Chinese companies: publicly-traded TIZA Information Industry 
Corporation Inc. (which provides industrial Internet IT services), and TIZA’s subsidiary 
 
40 Andrew R. Chow, Here's How Shopping Scams on Facebook Are Ripping Off Thousands of 
Customers, With the Money Flowing Overseas, TIME (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://time.com/5921820/facebook-shopping-scams-holidays-covid-19/ (last visited on July 2, 
2021). The two URL’s depicted in the scam ads in the screenshots in the text are: Sell22Ty.com 
and https://bit.ly/3dngAoU (which redirected to the wallien.store domain as of February 3, 
2021). According to the WHOIS database that tracks domain name registrations, the former 
domain was registered by a company in Hong Kong, and the latter domain was registered by a 
company in China. 
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Youkeshu, an e-commerce company. According to public records reviewed by Time, Youkeshu is 
the biggest shareholder of both Shenzhen Guiguyun software technology co., LTD—which owns 
the domain Kokoerp.com, where many of the scam sites appear—and Duo Tongguang Electronic 
Commerce Co., Ltd, a shell company that has been the subject of hundreds of complaints on PayPal 
and other sites. Email addresses and internal portals link the Youkeshu and Kokoerp domains 
together. And some “Kokoerp” scam victims have reported receiving boxes with YKS —
Youkeshu’s trading symbol — on the return label.  
I.  FTC Data Shows That the Volume of Scam Ads on Social Media Sites Like 
Facebook is Growing Rapidly 
58. Data collected by the FTC concerning social media fraud confirms that the volume 
of scam ads on social media sites like Facebook is growing rapidly. On October 21, 2020, the FTC 
issued a press release announcing that consumers reported losing more than $117 million on social 
media scams in just the first six months of 2020, as compared to $134 million for all of 2019. The 
latest FTC data indicates that consumer losses from social media scams totaled $131 million in the 
first quarter of 2021 alone — nearly the same number as the entire 2019.  
59. Critically, these numbers only represent the losses reported to the FTC and other 
law enforcement entities (primarily in the United States) that contribute data to the FTC’s 
Consumer Sentinel Network. It does not account for consumers who did not report their losses to 
enforcement authorities, which means total losses to U.S. consumers from social media scams 
exceeds what has been reported by the FTC.  
60. The FTC’s October 2020 press release also reported that “online shopping” fraud 
topped the list of complaints concerning social media fraud that consumers submitted to the FTC. 
Many of these consumers reported that they had attempted to purchase a product promoted in a 
social media ad, but then the item they ordered never arrived. Approximately 94% of these 
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J. Facebook Has No Incentive to Crack Down on Scam Ads
61. Facebook clearly has the investigative, financial, and technical resources to
effectively crack down on the volume of scam ads appearing on its website. As one example that 
Facebook is ready, willing, and able to marshal its resources when threatened, when hedge fund 
titan George Soros criticized Facebook at a global economic forum, Facebook’s COO, Sheryl 
Sandberg, promptly ordered an investigation to determine if Soros was selling Facebook stock 
short.41 
62. But with respect to scam ads, Facebook has no incentive to deploy its resources to
crack down because it is generating billions of dollars a year in ad sales from scam ads. As the 
Buzzfeed article reported, “according to current and former employees, as well as industry experts 
. . . Facebook typically keeps the money it earns from scam ads and fraudulent campaigns that 
pollute its platforms, unless it involves credit card fraud.”42 For example, Facebook “earned more 
than $50 million in revenue over two years from a single San Diego marketing agency that ripped 
off Facebook users by tricking them into hard-to-cancel subscriptions and investment scams, and 
it banked almost $10 million in advertising revenue from the Epoch Times, a pro-Trump media 
organization that spreads conspiracies, before banning the outlet’s ads for using fake accounts and 
other deceptive tactics.”43 
63. These and other examples cited by investigative journalists illustrate that
Facebook’s corporate culture prioritizes its own revenue growth over the safety of its users, a 
41 Nicholas Confessore and Matthew Rosenberg Sheryl Sandberg Asked for Soros Research, 
Facebook Acknowledges, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/technology/george-soros-facebook-sheryl-sandberg.html 
(last visited on July 2, 2021). 
42 Craig Silverman and Ryan Mac, Facebook Gets Rich Off Of Ads That Rip Off Its Users, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-ad-scams-revenue-china-tiktok-
vietnam (last visited on July 2, 2021). 
43 Id; see also Facebook’s Purchase Protection program only refunds money for purchases 
checked out through the Facebook website; purchases made through third-party sites, do not 
qualify for Purchase Protection. See Using Facebook, How does Purchase Protection work on 
Facebook?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/228307904608701 (last visited on July 
2, 2021). 
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reality further corroborated by other publicly disclosed tradeoffs the Company has made. For 
example, in November 2020, the New York Times reported that engineers and data scientists had 
developed an algorithm to predict whether posts by individual users were “bad for the world” (e.g., 
spread misinformation), and demote those posts in news feeds to reduce the spread of objectionable 
content.44 The algorithm “successfully reduced the visibility of objectionable content,” but since 
objectionable posts tend to be shared more broadly, the algorithm’s demotion of such posts 
decreased user sessions (a metric measuring time spent on Facebook). Fewer sessions meant fewer 
eyeballs and hence fewer ad dollars (as a former Facebook data scientist explained),45 and therefore 
the team tweaked the algorithm to reduce the strength of the demotion. That tweak “left more 
objectionable posts in users’ feeds,” but “did not reduce their sessions or time spent.”46 Only then 
did executives approve the algorithm. As with Deceptive Facebook Ads, revenue trumped user 
safety. 
64. A similar narrative has emerged from recently unsealed documents in a class action 
by advertisers against Facebook alleging that its “Potential Reach”47 metric was inflated and 
misleading. (DZ Reserve and Cain Maxwell v. Facebook, Inc., Civ. No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD (N.D. 
Cal.)). Internal documents referenced in plaintiffs’ recently unredacted opposition to dismiss (Dkt. 
257) reinforce that Facebook prioritizes revenue growth over integrity: 
 
 
44 Kevin Roose, Mike Isaac and Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Struggles to Balance Civility and 
Growth, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/technology/facebook-election-misinformation.html (last 
visited on July 2, 2021).  
45 Roddy Lindsay, Facebook Has a Recipe For Better Social Media. Why Isn’t The Company 
Using It?, THE INFORMATION (Nov. 27, 2020), 
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/facebook-has-a-recipe-for-better-social-media-why-
isnt-the-company-using-it (last visited on July 2, 2021).  
46 Kevin Roose, Mike Isaac and Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Struggles to Balance Civility and 
Growth, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/technology/facebook-election-misinformation.html  (last 
visited on July 2, 2021).  
47 Potential Reach is an estimation of how many people an ad can potentially reach depending on 
the targeting and ad placement. See 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1665333080167380?id=176276233019487 (last visited 
on July 2, 2021).  
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The Potential Reach Product Manager (Yaron Fidler) proposed a fix that would 
have decreased the Potential Reach numbers. Id. ¶¶ 80-81. But Facebook’s metrics 
leadership team rejected his proposal because the “revenue impact” for Facebook 
would be “significant.” Id. ¶¶ 80-82, 84. Fidler responded, “it’s revenue we should 
have never made given the fact it’s based on wrong data.” Id. ¶ 82. Fidler’s 
proposals to fix the flawed metric were repeatedly rejected. Id. ¶ 91. 
65. In sum, because Facebook prioritizes revenue growth over the safety of its users as
a matter of corporate policy, Facebook users continue to be bilked out of billions of dollars by 
scammers while Facebook continues to collect billions of dollars in revenues from those same 
scammers. Instead of employing its vast investigative, technical, and financial resources to 
vigorously crack down on scammers, Facebook is incentivized to continue investing money in 
“experience centers” and sales offices in China where Facebook knows a material percentage of 
advertisers are violating its Ad Policies. As author Tim Hwang observed to Buzzfeed, “I think the 
profit motive definitely makes it harder for Facebook to take real steps here.” 
PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERIENCES 
Anastasia Groschen 
66. On or about November 24, 2020, Ms. Groschen saw a Facebook ad for an activity
board that she thought would be appropriate for her toddler. The ad was designed to appear 
legitimate, and thus Ms. Groschen had no reason to believe it was actually promoting a fraudulent 
“bait-and-switch” scheme. The ad is no longer available in Facebook’s online ad library. 
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67. Ms. Groschen clicked the ad, which linked to a website with the domain 
“kidspunza.com.” Ms. Groschen saw the following activity board on the “kidspunza.com” website 
being sold for $24.98: 
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68. After reviewing the website, Ms. Groschen purchased the activity board for $24.98, 
plus $5.99 shipping, using her PayPal account. The purchase confirmation displayed the product 
Ms. Groschen had seen on the website: 
69. On November 27, 2020, Ms. Groschen received an email notification that the 
product she ordered had been shipped: 
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70. But when a package arrived on December 24, 2020, it did not contain the activity 
board she had ordered, but a cheap wooden “ABC” puzzle: 
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71. On December 24, 2020, Ms. Groschen wrote to the vendor through her PayPal 
account: 
I received a package with this tracking number today, however it is not what I 
ordered. I ordered a toddler busy board 60x80 cm [23.6 inches x 31.5 inches] with 
[a] variety of activities. The package contained a small wooden puzzle 8.5” x 11” 
size. They sell these in Dollar store. What a terrible service. I need my payment 
refunded please. 
72. Through PayPal, the vendor provided an address in China, and directed Ms. 
Groschen to take the item to the post office, ship it back to the address in China, and provide them 
with a tracking number.  
73. On January 11, 2021, Ms. Groschen responded that “I need you to send me a pre-
paid shipping label. I am not going to pay to send this back to China since it’s not my fault you 
sent me the wrong item.” 
74. On January 20, 2021, Ms. Groschen again asked for a prepaid shipping label on the 
ground that the company had sent her the wrong item and should pay to ship it back to China. 
75. Ms. Groschen declined to ship the item back to China at her own expense because 
she knew she was dealing with a scammer (indeed, another Facebook user who shipped a product 
back to China, reported that the seller claimed it never received the return, and refused to issue a 
credit, even though the buyer had a post office receipt). As a result, PayPal resolved Ms. 
Groschen’s case in the seller’s favor on January 29, 2021, and refused to issue any refund to Ms. 
Groschen. 
76. While the kidspunza.com website is still functioning as of February 10, 2021, the 
item that Ms. Groschen saw on the website after clicking the Facebook ad no longer appears on 
the website. But Ms. Groschen is not the only Facebook user damaged by Kidspunza’s bait-and-
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switch scheme, as evidenced by the numerous other complaints about the identical scam published 
to Kidspunza’s Facebook page.48 The following screenshots depict just two examples: 
77. According to the WHOIS database, the kidspunza.com domain was registered by
an organization in China on June 3, 2020. 
48 https://www.facebook.com/pg/Kidspunza-103657824859663/reviews/?ref=page_internal (last 
visited on February 12, 2021). The Kidspunza Facebook page has since been taken down by 
Facebook. 
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78. Additionally, as of February 10, 2021, the “kidspunza.com” Contact Us page 
identifies the website owner as a Chinese company (Shanghai HongMian Trading Co., Ltd.) with 
a mailing address in China: 
 
79. Ms. Groschen continues to regularly use Facebook and see Facebook ads, and is, 
therefore, vulnerable to future scams.  
80. As a result of the processes, practices, and policies at Facebook that are soliciting, 
encouraging, and assisting the display of Deceptive Facebook Ads, Ms. Groschen was harmed 
because she spent money on a product that she would not have otherwise purchased had she known 
she was being defrauded. 
Christopher Calise 
81. In or about September 11, 2020, Mr. Calise saw a Facebook ad for a car engine 
assembly kit.  The ad was designed to appear legitimate, and thus Mr. Calise had no reason to 
believe it was a Deceptive Facebook Ad. 
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82. Mr. Calise clicked the ad, which linked to a website with the domain miuxo.com.  
After reviewing the website, Mr. Calise purchased the car engine assembly kit for $48.97 using 
his debit card. 
 
 
83. On October 4, 2020, Mr. Calise emailed service@miuxo.com requesting tracking 
information for his order.  After not receiving any response, on October 15, 2020, Mr. Calise 
emailed again inquiring about a delivery date.  Mr. Calise never heard back from the company and 
the car engine assembly kit was never delivered.  
84. Mr. Calise did not receive a refund of the purchase price he paid. 
85. In November 2020, Mr. Calise reported Miuxo’s ad to Facebook. Facebook agreed 
that the ad violated its Ad Policies and claimed to have removed it. Yet, according to Facebook’s 
online ad library, Miuxo was able to launch a new Facebook ad promoting another engine assembly 
kit in December 2020 under the name Miuxo-shop, which scammed additional Facebook users:  
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86. The following screenshots depict just three examples of additional Facebook users 








49 https://www.facebook.com/Miuxo-shop-112359277218742/reviews/?ref=page_internal (last 
visited on July 2, 2021). The Miuxo-shop Facebook page has since been taken down by 
Facebook. 
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87. Upon information and belief, the ad seen by Mr. Calise was placed by a Hong 
Kong-based scammer. 
88. Mr. Calise continues to regularly use Facebook and see Facebook ads, and is, 
therefore, vulnerable to future scams.  
89. As a result of the processes, practices, and policies at Facebook that are soliciting, 
encouraging, and assisting the display of Deceptive Facebook Ads, Mr. Calise was harmed because 
he spent money on a product that he would not have otherwise purchased had he known he was 
being defrauded. 
90. Prior to filing suit against Facebook, on behalf of himself and the proposed classes, 
Mr. Calise made a reasonable attempt to settle the claims alleged herein short of litigation by 
delivering a presuit demand to Facebook on June 1, 2021 through counsel notifying Facebook of 
his grievances and proposed remedies. That settlement attempt was ultimately unsuccessful 
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because Facebook refused to provide Mr. Calise with all of the internal documents he needed to 
reasonably investigate the claims alleged herein and implement appropriate remedies. 
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
91. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) on behalf of the following 
proposed Class and Subclass (collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Classes”): 
Injunctive Relief Class (“Class”) 
All individuals with an active Facebook account. 
Damages Subclass (“Subclass”) 
All individuals with an active Facebook account who, between August 11, 2017 
through the present, clicked on a Deceptive Facebook Ad and suffered harm. 
92. Specifically excluded from the Classes are Facebook, its officers, directors, agents, 
trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, 
partners, joint venturers, or entities controlled by Facebook, and their heirs, successors, assigns, or 
other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Facebook and/or its officers and/or directors, 
the judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 
93. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class and Subclass definitions above if 
further investigation and/or discovery reveals that such definitions should be expanded, narrowed, 
divided into further subclasses, or otherwise modified in any way. 
94. The Classes satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules 23(a): numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 
95. Numerosity. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable.  While the precise number of the members in each of the Classes is 
presently unknown, Facebook’s latest Form 10-K indicates that there are approximately 195 
million daily active Facebook users in the United States and Canada. Further, internal Facebook 
records referenced above indicate that Facebook generates billions of dollars a year in revenue 
from ads purchased by China-based companies, and that 30% of these ads violate one or more of 
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Facebook’s ad policies. This means that, conservatively, millions of Facebook users in the United 
States are regularly exposed to Deceptive Facebook Ads.   
96. Existence of common questions of law and fact.  Common questions of law and 
fact exist as to all members of the Classes.  The common factual and legal questions include, but 
are not limited to, the following: 
(a) Whether Facebook actively solicits, encourages, and assists scammers 
whom it knows or should know are placing Deceptive Facebook Ads; 
(b) Whether Facebook owes legal duties to Classes, and breached and continues 
to breach those duties; 
(c) Whether Facebook breached and continues to breach its Terms of Service 
with members of the Classes; 
(d) Whether Facebook breached and continues to breach its covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing with members of the Classes; 
(e) Whether Facebook engaged and continues to engage in unfair business 
practices under the UCL; 
(f) Whether Facebook was and continues to be unjustly enriched at the expense 
of members of the Classes; 
(g) Whether Facebook’s misconduct alleged herein caused and continues to 
cause harm to members of the Classes;  
(h) Whether Facebook has the capability to implement changes to processes, 
practices, and policies to vet new advertisers before permitting them to 
display ads; 
(i) Whether Facebook has the capability to implement changes to processes, 
practices, and policies to prevent repeat offenders from circumventing 
enforcement mechanisms to continue displaying scam ads; 
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(j) Whether Facebook has the capability to implement changes to processes, 
practices, and policies to more adequately process and respond to reports of 
scam ads submitted by Facebook users; 
(k) Whether Facebook has the capability to implement changes to processes, 
practices, and policies to more adequately identify and remove ads that 
violate Facebook’s ad policies; 
(l) Whether Facebook has the capability to implement changes to processes, 
practices, and policies to educate users about the location and use of tools 
available to protect themselves against scam ads; 
(m) Whether Facebook has the capability to compensate Facebook employees 
and contractors tasked with monitoring Facebook’s websites for scam ads 
to ensure, among other things, that such employees and contractors are 
incentivized to prioritize protection of Facebook users from Deceptive 
Facebook Ads; 
(n) Whether Facebook has the capability to compensate Facebook’s sales, 
marketing, and business development teams to ensure, among other things, 
that such teams are not financially incentivized to solicit scammers or 
encourage scammers to continue purchasing Facebook ads; 
(o) Whether Facebook has the capability to expand Facebook’s existing 
Purchase Protection program for purchases made on the Facebook website 
to victims who are tricked by scammers into fraudulent transactions 
occurring off the Facebook website; 
(p) Whether Class members are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, 
including without limitation, the Proposed Injunctive Relief to prevent 
future harm; and 
(q) Whether Subclass members are entitled to damages and/or disgorgement of 
unjustly earned profits as a result of Facebook’s misconduct. 
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97. Typicality.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
Classes in that the claims of Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes are reasonably co-
extensive, and arise from the same course of wrongful conduct by Facebook. 
98. Adequacy of representation.  Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the members of the Classes.  Plaintiffs have retained counsel highly experienced in 
complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to vigorously prosecute this action. 
Further, Plaintiffs have no interests that are antagonistic to those of the other members of the 
Classes. 
99. The Class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) because Facebook has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby making 
appropriate final declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Class members as a whole. 
100. The Subclass also satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules 23(b)(3):
predominance and superiority. 
101. Predominance. The common issues identified above will predominate over any
questions affecting only individual Subclass members. In particular, Facebook’s liability will be 
determined by reference to the Terms of Service, as well as other common evidence in the form of 
Facebook’s internal records, including internal studies (such as referenced in paragraph 46 above), 
financial records, and databases storing information concerning the display of every ad to every 
user, including the date of display, the identity of the user, the identity of the advertiser, and the 
amount paid by the advertiser to Facebook for the ad.50 
102. Superiority.  A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and
efficient adjudication of this controversy.  The damages or other financial detriment suffered by 
individual Subclass members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would 
be involved in individual litigation of their claims against Facebook.  It would, thus, be virtually 
50 See How advertisers’ audience selections appear in “Why am I seeing this ad?”, FACEBOOK 
FOR BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/m/why-am-i-seeing-this-ad (last visited on 
July 9, 2021); Facebook Ad Library, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/ (last 
visited August 9, 2021); DZ Reserve, et al. v. Facebook, Inc., 18-cv-04978-JD (N.D. Cal.), Dkt 
No. 227 at Sec. II at 2-3. 
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impossible for the Subclass members, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the 
wrongs committed against them.  Furthermore, individualized litigation would create the danger 
of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts.  Individualized 
litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the 
issues raised by this action.  By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of 
adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive 
supervision by a single United States District Court, and presents no unusual management 
difficulties under the circumstances presented in this case. 
103. Alternatively, at a minimum, particular common issues are appropriate for class 
treatment under Rule 23(c)(4). 
COUNT I 
Negligence 
104. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all the allegations contained
above. 
105. Facebook has a special relationship with members of the Classes, and owes them
independent legal duties to perform the services it provides to them in a manner that protects them 
from being defrauded by advertisers who place Deceptive Facebook Ads (“Deceptive Facebook 
Advertisers”), because among other reasons (i) it is foreseeable — indeed, a virtual certainty — 
that Deceptive Facebook Advertisers will harm members of the Classes by causing them to spend 
money purchasing products they would not have otherwise purchased had they known they were 
being defrauded; (ii) from a policy standpoint, holding that Facebook has no duty to members of 
the Classes under these circumstances to protect them from Deceptive Facebook Advertisers will 
permit Facebook to continue its practice of prioritizing the billions of dollars in annual revenue it 
collects from Deceptive Facebook Advertisers over preventing the harm such advertisers cause 
members of the Classes, thereby putting millions of additional Facebook users at future risk of 
being defrauded by Deceptive Facebook Advertisers; and (iii) Facebook’s conduct is morally 
blameworthy since it has the investigative, technical and financial resources to crack down much 
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more vigorously and effectively on Deceptive Facebook Advertisers without undue burden, but 
refuses to do so because enforcing its Ad Policies too strictly would eliminate the billions of dollars 
in annual revenue it collects from such advertisers. 
106. Facebook breached the duty of care it owed to members of the Classes by actively
soliciting, encouraging, and assisting Deceptive Facebook Advertisers it knew or should have 
known were defrauding Facebook users, including without limitation, by taking the following 
actions:  
(a) Actively undertaking various marketing efforts (including conferences,
tradeshows, meetups, and parties) to encourage advertisers that it knew
were displaying, or had displayed Deceptive Facebook Ads that violated
Facebook’s Ad Policies to “buy more” Facebook ads and “spend more” on
Facebook ads;
(b) Actively soliciting and training advertisers in China despite knowing for
years that a material percentage of the Facebook ads placed by China-based
companies violate one or more of Facebook’s Ad Policies;
(c) Affirmatively directing employees and contractors monitoring Facebook’s
platform for Deceptive Facebook Ads to ignore violations of Facebook’s
Ad Policies, as long as Facebook gets paid for those ads;
(d) Affirmatively directing employees and contractors monitoring Facebook’s
platform for Deceptive Facebook Ads to ignore ads placed by hacked
Facebook accounts and pages, as long as Facebook gets paid for those ads;
(e) Affirmatively directing employees and contractors monitoring Facebook’s
platform for Deceptive Facebook Ads to “look the other way” and refrain
from enforcing Facebook’s Ad Policies against Deceptive Facebook Ads
placed by China-based companies (since Facebook “want[s] China
revenue”); and
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(f) Affirmatively enabling Deceptive Facebook Advertisers whose accounts 
were banned to quickly resume placing Deceptive Facebook Ads through 
lax enforcement of Facebook’s ad policies. 
107. By breaching its duty to members of the Classes, Facebook created a risk for 
members of the Classes, and made their position worse. 
108. Facebook knew or should have known that breach of its duty to members of the 
Classes to protect them from Deceptive Facebook Advertisers would harm members of the 
Classes. 
109. As a direct and proximate result of Facebook’s breach of its duty, members of the 
Classes foreseeably suffered damages. To redress such harm, Plaintiffs seek the relief set forth 
below on behalf of themselves and other members of the Classes. 
COUNT II 
Breach of Contract 
110.  Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations set 
forth above. 
111. Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes entered into a services contract with 
Facebook consisting of the TOS, which incorporated by reference the Community Standards, and 
the Advertising Policies. 
112. The TOS contains enforceable promises that Facebook made to the Plaintiffs and 
other members of the Classes, including but not limited to, as set forth below. 
113. In Section 1 of the TOS, Facebook states that (i) “[p]eople will only build 
community on Facebook if they feel safe,” and promises that (ii) “[w]e employ dedicated teams 
around the world and develop advanced technical systems to detect misuse of our Products, 
harmful conduct towards others, and situations where we may be able to help support or protect 
our community.” Facebook further promises that “[i]f we learn of content or conduct like this, we 
will take appropriate action - for example, offering help, removing content, removing or 
restricting access to certain features, disabling an account, or contacting law enforcement.” 
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Facebook materially breached these promises by actively and affirmatively soliciting, 
encouraging, and assisting Deceptive Facebook Advertisers it knew or should have known were 
defrauding Facebook users, including without limitation, by taking the actions detailed in 
paragraph 106(a)-(f) above.  
114. In Section 1 of the TOS, Facebook further promises that “we develop automated
systems to improve our ability to detect and remove abusive and dangerous activity that may 
harm our community and the integrity of our Products.” Facebook materially breached this 
promise by actively and affirmatively soliciting, encouraging, and assisting Deceptive Facebook 
Advertisers it knew or should have known were defrauding Facebook users, including without 
limitation, by taking the actions detailed in paragraph 106(a)-(f) above. 
115. The Community Standards incorporated by reference in Section 3 of the TOS
provide in relevant part “[w]e are committed to making Facebook a safe place,” and in the “Safety” 
section Facebook promises “Fraud and Deception: In an effort to prevent fraudulent activity that 
can harm people or businesses, we remove content that purposefully deceives, willfully 
misrepresents or otherwise defrauds or exploits others for money or property.” Facebook 
materially breached this promise by actively and affirmatively soliciting, encouraging, and 
assisting Deceptive Facebook Advertisers it knew or should have known were defrauding 
Facebook users, including without limitation, by taking the actions detailed in paragraph 106(a)-
(f) above.
116. Plaintiffs have performed all, or substantially all, of their material obligations under
the TOS. 
117. As a direct and proximate result of Facebook’s material breaches of the TOS as
described above, members of the Classes suffered damages and Facebook unjustly profited. To 
redress such harm, Plaintiffs seek the relief set forth below on behalf of themselves and other 
members of the Classes. 
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Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
118.  Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations set 
forth above. 
119. In every contract there is an implied promise of good faith and fair dealing. 
120. Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes entered into a services contract with 
Facebook consisting of the TOS, which incorporated by reference the Community Standards, and 
the Advertising Policies. 
121. The TOS contains enforceable promises that Facebook made to the Plaintiffs and 
other members of the Classes, including without limitation, the promises set forth in paragraphs 
113-115  above. 
122. By actively and affirmatively soliciting, encouraging, and assisting Deceptive 
Facebook Advertisers it knew or should have known were defrauding Facebook users — including 
without limitation, by taking the actions detailed in paragraph 106(a)-(f) above — Facebook 
engaged in conduct that frustrated and interfered with the rights of Plaintiffs and other members 
of the Classes to the benefits of the TOS (including without limitation, the right to a safe 
environment while using Facebook and right to be protected against being scammed by Deceptive 
Facebook Ads). 
123. Plaintiffs have performed all, or substantially all, of their material obligations under 
the TOS. 
124. As a direct and proximate result of Facebook’s breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, members of the Classes suffered damages and Facebook unjustly profited. To 
redress such harm, Plaintiffs seek the relief set forth below on behalf of themselves and other 
members of the Classes. 
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Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”) 
125. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations set 
forth above. 
126. The UCL prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice.” 
127. By actively and affirmatively soliciting, encouraging, and assisting Deceptive 
Facebook Advertisers it knew or should have known were defrauding Facebook users — including 
without limitation, by taking the actions detailed in paragraph 106(a)-(f) above — Facebook 
violated the unfair prong of the UCL because such misconduct (i) was oppressive, immoral, 
unethical, and unscrupulous; (ii) caused substantial injury to members of the Classes who were 
victimized by Deceptive Facebook Ads; and (iii) violated established public policy against 
deceptive conduct by businesses. Further, such misconduct allowed Facebook to have an unfair 
advantage over competitors that do not solicit, encourage, or assist deceptive advertisers. 
Additionally, Facebook’s justifications or reasons for, or the utility or benefit (if any) for its 
misconduct were substantially outweighed by the substantial economic harm that such misconduct 
caused members of the Classes. Finally, the harm caused by Facebook’s misconduct is not one 
that members of the Classes could have reasonably avoided given Facebook’s exclusive 
knowledge of and control over its internal sales and enforcement policies and practices, and the 
fact that Deceptive Facebook Advertisers deliberately design their Deceptive Facebook Ads to 
look legitimate, and thus when they first see such ads, members of the Classes have no reason to 
believe that those ads are actually promoting bait-and-switch or other fraudulent schemes.  
128. As a result of Facebook’s UCL violations as described above, Plaintiffs and other 
members of the Classes have suffered injury, including but not limited to, paying for products they 
saw advertised on Facebook that they would not have otherwise purchased had they known they 
were being defrauded.  
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129. Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims against Facebook for its UCL violations 
because they saw Deceptive Facebook Ads placed by Deceptive Facebook Advertisers; reasonably 
and justifiably relied on the misrepresentations in those ads to purchase the products featured in 
those ads; and suffered losses when the Deceptive Facebook Advertisers who placed those ads 
intentionally did not deliver the products that Plaintiffs had purchased.   The Deceptive Facebook 
Ads were presented to members of the Classes due to Facebook’s own conduct of soliciting, 
encouraging, and assisting scammers it knows or should know are using its platform to defraud 
Facebook users with Deceptive Facebook Ads.  
130. Plaintiffs would have considered it important to their decisions to purchase the 
products displayed in the ads they saw on Facebook’s platform to know that the Deceptive 
Facebook Advertisers who placed those ads had no intention of delivering the products displayed 
in those ads. Indeed, any reasonable Facebook user would have wanted to know that information. 
131. Because of Facebook’s UCL violations described above, Plaintiffs suffered injury, 
and lost money, by paying for products featured in Deceptive Facebook Ads that they would not 
have otherwise purchased had they known they were being defrauded. 
132. Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes are entitled to injunctive relief against 
Facebook under the UCL, including, without limitation, the Proposed Injunctive Relief. 
COUNT V 
Unjust Enrichment 
133. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations set 
forth above. 
134. Facebook collects tens of thousands of data points from each Facebook user. This 
data has enormous financial value because it enables Facebook to sell precisely targeted ads to 
millions of advertisers. Yet, Facebook does not pay any compensation to Facebook users for this 
data. 
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135. Facebook knows, or should know, that Deceptive Facebook Advertisers are 
exploiting its targeting capabilities to Deceptive Facebook Ads to vulnerable Facebook users most 
likely to click on those ads, and be lured into bait-and-switch and other fraudulent schemes.  
136. But rather than using its vast investigative, technical, and financial capabilities and 
resources to crack down on Deceptive Facebook Advertisers, Facebook actively solicits, 
encourages, and assists Deceptive Facebook Advertisers it knows or should know are defrauding 
Facebook users, including without limitation, by taking the actions detailed in paragraph 106 (a)-
(f) above. 
137. Deceptive Facebook Advertisers solicited, encouraged, and assisted by Facebook 
have scammed and continue to scam Facebook users out of billions of dollars by displaying 
Deceptive Facebook Ads that target users based on the data that Facebook has collected from those 
users. In turn, Facebook has earned and continues to earn billions of dollars in profits from 
Deceptive Facebook Advertisers. In particular, as alleged above, even after banning the accounts 
of certain Deceptive Facebook Advertisers, Facebook retains all of the revenue collected from 
those advertisers. 
138. It would be unjust for Facebook to retain the billions of dollars in profits that it has 
earned from Deceptive Facebook Advertisers that it solicited, encouraged, and assisted at the 
expense of the Facebook users who were deceived by those advertisers.  
139. Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes are entitled to disgorgement of all 
profits that Facebook has unjustly earned and continues to unjustly earn from Deceptive Facebook 
Advertisers at the expense of members of the Classes. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for a judgment in its favor and in favor of the 
Class as follows: 
A. Certifying this action as a class action, appointing Plaintiffs as 
Representatives of the Classes, and appointing Plaintiffs’ undersigned counsel as Counsel 
for the Classes, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
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B. Awarding declaratory and injunctive relief, including but not limited to, the
Proposed Injunctive Relief; 
C. Awarding Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes monetary
compensation in the form of damages, and/or disgorgement of Facebook’s unjustly earned 
profits; 
D. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Classes attorneys’ fees and costs (including,
without limitation, under Section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure); 
E. Awarding Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes prejudgment and
post-judgment interest; and 
F. Providing any and all further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiffs request a trial by jury of all claims that can be so tried. 
 DATED:  August 11, 2021 LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 
By: /s/ Adam M. Apton 
Adam M. Apton (State Bar No. 316506) 
388 Market Street, Suite 1300 




Mark S. Reich (pro hac vice to be filed) 
Courtney E. Maccarone (pro hac vice to be filed) 
LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 
55 Broadway, 10th Floor 





Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed 
Classes 
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